Democratic Stability and Institutional Reforms in Pakistan

Abstract

The process of creating democratic stability in Pakistan is marked by the alternation between the rule of the military-bureaucrats and the weak interim periods of the rule of the civilians. This research paper looks at the effectiveness of institutional reforms in Pakistan especially during the time after the democratic transition in 2008 up to the outcome of the 2024 General Elections. Based on the qualitative approach to the study further supported by the secondary data sources (World Bank, BTI, UNDP) and the domestic observation reports (FAFEN, PILDAT), the research investigates the influence of the 18th Constitutional Amendment on federalism and civilian supremacy. The results indicate that although the amendment effectively destroyed the legal foundation of presidential interventions and decentralized powers to the provinces, it created an unintentional reactive hybrid model of governance, commonly known as the Bajwa Policy of centralization of control of the economy and security. The report also examines the issue of the judicial system by revealing that there is an abysmal justice gap upon which the rule of law is compromised by inefficiency in the processes and cases pending in court, numbering to more than two million. The 2024 elections are discussed as a turning point where the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) technology and strategy planning had a major failure of transparency, such as internet outages and scandals of seats distribution. The research finds that the attainment of sustainable democratic stability demands a fundamental change in terms of zero-sum politics to a consensus-based political settlement, in which internal party democracy, judicial modernization and the actual removal of the non-elected institutions involved in the political arena are the key elements.